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NOTES
Sex Discrimination in Employment Under
Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964
I. INTRODUCrION
On July 2, 1964, President Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,' the most far-reaching civil rights legislation in history.
Much has been written about the act, but almost without exception
the writers have been concerned with the ban of discrimination in
employment on the basis of race or color. But the most radical and
troublesome characteristic of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is its
outlawing of employment discrimination based on sex.2 It is the pur-
pose of this note to examine this largely ignored aspect of the act.
The inquiry will first examine the regulation of sex discrimination
generally under the federal constitution and federal and state laws.
Emphasis here will be placed on the treatment of discrimination
under the fourteenth amendment, the Railway Labor Act, the National
Labor Relations Act and, of primary importance, the interaction of
Title VII with the similar provisions of the Equal Pay Act of 1963.3
The legislative history of the inclusion of the word "sex" in Title VII
will be examined, and a synopsis will be presented, to indicate the
types of employment practices which have been deemed by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to be violative of the pro-
vision of the act. Finally, there will be an examination of the two
aspects of the law which give rise to the greatest problems: the bona
fide occupational qualification exception under which discrimination
is permitted,4 and the relationship between Title VII, state fair em-
ployment practice laws, and state laws regulating the employment
of women.5
II. THE TREATMENT OF SEX DISCRENATION UNDER OTER LA-Ws
A. Federal Law
During the 1960's, more concern has been shown for the legal status
of women than at any other time since the adoption of the nineteenth
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964), bars employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
3. 29 U.S.c. § 206(d) (1964).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964).
5. See text, Part IV infra and accompanying notes.
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amendment.6 This concern has been evidenced by executive orders
establishing commissions to study the problems surrounding the status
of women7 and by the passage of the Equal Pay Act, amending the
Fair Labor Standards Act.8 Such action shows marked contrast to
previous lack of concern for women's rights. Until the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,9 sex had generally been an accepted ground for discrimi-
nation.
Attempts at explicit constitutional prohibition of sex discrimination,
in the form of an equal rights amendment prohibiting the denial or
abridgement of rights on account of sex have been introduced in
every Congress since 1923.10 Such amendments have passed the Senate
twice, each time with the "Hayden rider" attached." However, with
the repeated defeat of this amendment, the nineteenth amendment
remains the only constitutional mention of sex.'2 Efforts to gain
equality of the sexes under the various aspects of the fourteenth
amendment have also met with failure.13 The equal protection clause
requires that any legislative classification be rationally related to some
goal which the state has a right to achieve,14 but state laws discrimi-
nating between the sexes have been repeatedly upheld without spe-
cific proof of such relation.'5 Likewise, the privileges and immunities
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
7. Exec. Order No. 10,980, 26 Fed. Reg. 12059 (1961), established the President's
Commission on the Status of Women. The Commission submitted its report in
October, 1963. Exec. Order No. 11,126, 26 Fed. Reg. 717 (1963), set up the
Interdepartmental Committee and Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women
to carry out the recommendations of the President's Commission.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964). This provided for equal pay for equal work without
discrimination on the basis of sex. For further discussion, see Part II, § A infra.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
10. Pnzsmm&r's COzM'N Oie =z STATuS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF Tra CoMIrrTEE
ON Crvm AND PoLITIcAL Riosers 32 (1963). In its present form, the amendment pro-
vides that "equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex." See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 11, and S.J.
Res. 85, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1965).
11. The amendment "shall not be construed to impair any rights, benefits, or ex-
emptions now or hereafter conferred by law, upon persons of the female sex." 96
CoNG. REc. 872-73 (1950); 99 CONG. REc. 8954-55 (1953).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex "in legis-
lation prescribing the qualifications of suffrage." This wording has generally been
construed literally.
13. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), the Court held that due
process does not prohibit selection of jurors of only one sex. This holding was later
reaffirmed in Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
14. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
15. There are numerous cases upholding liquor laws which treat the sexes differently
without a connective link between the statutory distinction and the aim of the statute.
See, e.g., Henson v. City of Chicago, 415 I1. 564, 114 N.E.2d 778 (1953); Anderson
v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N.W.2d 538 (1948). There is also an abun-
dance of cases upholding laws providing for different criminal punishments for the
sexes, different marriage qualifications, and different political rights, seemingly with-
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clause has been held not to confer upon a woman the right to prac-
tice law in a state.16 It is this obvious gap in constitutional protection
of women's equal rights which has led to the proposal for an equal
rights amendment and which supported the inclusion of the word"sex" in Title VII.17
The problem of discrimination has been dealt with under the
national labor statutes. The Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad 8 held that the Railway Labor Act' 9 imposes on a
bargaining representative the duty to fairly represent the interests of
all members of its craft or class without discrimination. A later case
under the act specifically banned union representation discrimination
based on race, color, or creed.20 The duty of fair representation,
however, has not been extended to prevent racial discrimination in
the denial of membership,2' which is expressly forbidden under
Title VII. 2 Although it would appear that the duty of fair repre-
sentation established by the Steele case might impliedly ban dis-
crimination against female members of a bargaining unit, the
specific question of sex discrimination has not arisen under the
act. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has taken steps
under the National Labor Relations Act similar to those in
Steele to insure fair representation by a union, and will consider
rescinding any certification of a bargaining representative if that
representative denies equal representation to the employees in the
unit for certain discriminatory reasons.P In determining an appropri-
ate bargaining unit, the NLRB generally considers only such factors
as skills, duties, and interests of employees; sex or race are not proper
out the distinctions furthering the statutory aims. See generally Kanowitz, Sex-Based
Discrimination in American Law, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 293 (1967).
16. In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894).
17. "[W]e withhold from our women a constitutional guarantee of equal treatment
under the law ...... S. REP. No. 1558, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1967).
18. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). A supplemental collective bargaining agreement between
defendant and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen to discriminate against Negro
firemen with the ultimate aim of excluding all Negroes from service was held illegal.
19. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1964). This act establishes a procedure whereby the em-
ployees' choice of collective bargaining agent may be ascertained in the railway and
airlines industries and sets up the National Mediation Board as the agency for the
settlement of representation disputes.
20. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
21. Oliphant v. Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935, rehearing denied, 359 U.S. 962 (1959).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
23. Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Pioneer Bus Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 54 (1962). Racial discrimination in membership classification, segregation
of workers, or discrimination in the proceessing of grievances by a union will affect
a union's certification. Locals 1 & 2, Independent Metal Workers (Hughes Tool Co.),
147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
[ VOL. 21
distinctions in unit determination.' But despite its expressed disap-
proval of racial discrimination, the NLRB never applied the NLRA's
unfair labor practice sanctions to discrimination unrelated to employee
organizational and bargaining rights until its decision in Miranda
Fuel,25 holding that discriminatory representation by the union and
acquiescence by the employer violated employees' fundamental rights
under section 7 of the NLRA.2 The Labor Board's holding was denied
enforcement by the Second Circuit2 on the basis that the unfair labor
practice sanctions should be applied only to discriminatory conduct
encouraging or discouraging union membership and therefore section
7 does not provide a broad right against discrimination in a general
sense. Despite this reversal, the Board has persisted in its holding,28
and has won the approval of the Fifth Circuit,9 but the conflict has
yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court.30 The positions of the
NLRB and the Fifth Circuit appear to be the better, since treating
discrimination as an unfair labor practice brings it within the jurisdic-
tion of the Board, which can then provide the employee with a less
expensive and more equitable decision than he might get in court.
24. For decisions holding that race is not a proper factor, see, e.g., Andrews Indus.
105 N.L.R.B. 946 (1953); J. R. Simplot Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 771 (1952). The Board
has held that units based upon separation of the sexes are inappropriate, Under-
writers Salvage Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 337 (1952), and it will dismiss a petition for
designating a unit predicated on such a separation absent a showing that there exists
a substantial difference in skills between male and female employees. See Lloyd
Hollister, Inc., 55 N.L.R.B. 32 (1944); H. W. Wilson Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 938 (1943).
This requirement that there exist a substantial difference in the skills of the sexes
parallels to some extent the exception under Title VII, treated in Part IV, infra,
permitting sex discrimination when it is based on a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion.
25. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962). The Board found that the employer's acquiescence
to the union's demand for reduction in the seniority of a Negro union member was
an unfair labor practice by both employer and union, violating sections 8(b) (1) (A),
8(b)(2), 8(a)(1), and 8(a)(3).
26. Section 7 guarantees employees the right to organize, to form, join or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively, or to refrain from taking part in any or
all of these activities. Sections 8(a) and 8(b) make employer and union interference
with these right an unfair labor practice.
27. Miranda Fuel v. Teamsters Local 553, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
28. Locals 1 & 2, Independent Metal Workers (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B.
1573 (1964). The Board again held that racial discrimination by a bargaining rep-
resentative could support the finding of an unfair labor practice.
29. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
The court held that where a grievance would have been processed to arbitration but
for arbitrary and racially discriminatory reasons, the refusal to so process was a viola-
tion of the union's duty to represent its members "without hostile discrimination, fairly,
impartially, and in good faith." The court rejected the narrow interpretation of §§
8(a) and 8(b) used by the Second Circuit in Miranda Fuel and held this to be an
unfair labor practice.
30. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), the Supreme Court was presented with
an opportunity to settle the split of authority, but it declined to do so.
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Although the cases before the Board have dealt with racial discrimi-
nation, under Title VII, the unfair labor practice sanction will be
extended to sex discrimination, so that the Board may become an
available forum for an aggrieved female employee.
The Equal Pay Act,3' a 1963 amendment to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, provided the first specific federal statutory ban against
sex discrimination, stating that an employer may not base wage differ-
entials on the factor of sex. For purposes here, the primary concern
with the Equal Pay Act centers around its interpretation in conjunc-
tion with Title VII of the Civil Right Act. By its own terms in sec-
tion 703(h), 32 Title VII requires that it be harmonized with the
Equal Pay Act, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) has expressed the view that the Equal Pay Act is incorpo-
rated into Title VII to the extent that wage differentials based on sex
which are exempted from and, therefore, authorized by the Equal
Pay Act will not be unlawful under Title VII.33 Some of the more
important exemptions from the Equal Pay Act are: executive, ad-
ministrative and professional employees and outside salesmen. 1 There
are, however, no similar exemptions from Title VII, and it is the
opinion of the EEOC that although the Title VII ban against sex
discrimination is co-extensive with that of the Equal Pay Act, it is not
limited to the latter's express coverage.- s So as concerns the coverage
of employees, Title VII is clearly broader than the Equal Pay Act in
banning sex discrimination in wages. But the latter act serves to limit
Title VII by its incorporation, since under it, and therefore under
31. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964): "(1) No employer having employees subject to
. .. this section shall discriminate . .. between employees on the basis of sex by
paying wages to employees ...at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages
to employees of the opposite sex .. . for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under
similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any factor other
than sex." The act further provides that no labor organization shall cause or attempt
to cause an employer to violate paragraph (1).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964): "It shall not be an unlawful employment
practice under this subchapter for an employer to differentiate upon the basis of
sex in determining the amount of the wages . .. paid to employees . .. if such
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29."
33. EEOC Opinion Letter, Dec. 29, 1965, reprinted in CCH EMPLOYMENT PnAc-
Ecvs ff 17,251.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1964). A complete list of exemptions is defined and de-
limited in 29 C.F.R. §§ 775-86 (1967).
35. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1967).
The regulations under the Equal Pay Act agree that the act does not excuse non-
compliance with other state or federal laws imposing a higher standard of equality.
29 C.F.R. § 800.160 (1967).
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Title VII, such discrimination is legal when pursuant to a seniority
system, a system measuring earnings by quantity or quality of pro-
duction, or a differential based on a factor other than sex.
An important comparison to be made is the relative effectiveness
of the remedies under the two acts. Since the Equal Pay Act states
that, for purposes of enforcement, wages due under the equal pay
standard will be treated as unpaid minimum wages and overtime
pay,3 it will have the same remedies as the minimum wage and
overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The
remedies thus available will be: (1) private suits by the employee
to recover back wages due under the law plus an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages; (2) criminal action by the Justice
Department against "willful" violators; and (3) suits by the Secretary
of Labor to collect pay due employees under the act or to enjoin
employers from violations 8 In sharp contrast, an employee injured
under Title VII must look first to the EEOC for a remedy. The EEOC
has no direct authority to enforce the law, but is limited to preliminary
investigation and the informal methods of counsel, conciliation and
persuasion to eliminate conduct it believes wrongful. It may not
petition a court for enforcement of its findings, but can only notify
the complainant of failure of the informal means, giving him 30 days
in which to file a suit.a9 Since the remedies under the Equal Pay Act
are so obviously more effective than those of Title VII, one complain-
ing of sex discrimination within the purview of both acts would be
well advised to proceed under the Equal Pay Act. The shortcoming
of the Equal Pay Act is that it is limited to guaranteeing equal pay,
and this guarantee is of little value to women who are denied the
initial employment opportunity. It is this latter problem with which
only Title VII deals.
B. State Law
At the time of the enactment of Title VII, 25 states had Fair Em-
ployment Practice (FEP) laws, none of which barred employment
discrimination based on sex. Several states did and still do have laws
regulating the employment of women, including: (a) prohibitions
against employment in certain occupations; (b) maximum hour laws;
(c) minimum wage laws; (d) prohibitions against employment dur-
ing certain night hours; (e) weight lifting limitations; and (f) re-
36. See note 33 supra. See also Kilpatrick v. Sweet, 262 F. Supp. 561 (M.D. Fla.
1967), which held that if there are any factors for discrimination other than sex, then
no violation of the Equal Pay Act.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(3) (1964).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1964).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (1964).
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quirements for special facilities such as rest rooms and seats for
women.40 Since the enactment of Title VII, there has been a marked
expansion in state FEP laws, and as of December 5, 1965, ten states
had enacted FEP laws which outlaw employment discrimination on
the ground of sex (in addition to race, color, religion and national
origin), and provide for civil sanctions enforceable by state adminis-
trative authorities.4 ' The important aspect of state FEP laws and state
laws regulating the employment of women is their interaction with
Title VII. The complex problems arising from this will be examined
in Part IV below.
C. Arbitration Decisions
Labor arbitrators deciding disputes under collective bargaining
agreements have developed different trends in the different classifica-
tions of disputes concerning sex discrimination. The most noticeable
common thread running through the arbitration awards is that when
sex discrimination is complained of, the arbitrators attempt to establish
whether there is discrimination or whether, in the particular instance,
sex is a necessary and valid ground for distinction between employees.
Thus, in decisions involving a senior employee "bumping" a junior
out of his job in order to avoid being laid off, arbitrators have held
that a woman may not bump a junior male if she lacks the physical
requirements for his job2 or is otherwise unqualified, 43 and that a
senior male may not bump a junior female if her job is properly
designated as "female" in the collective bargaining agreement.4 4 Like-
wise, in decisions involving rates of pay, arbitrators examine whether
sex is a valid ground of distinction. If jobs are not similar, then a
demand for equal wages will usually be denied,45 but different sexes
doing the same work have been awarded equal rates .46 The similarity
40. For a full discussion of these types of state protective laws, see Waters, Sex,
State Protective Laws and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 18 LAB. L.J. 344, 348-49
(1967).
41. Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Utah, Wiscon-
sin, Wyoming and the District of Columbia are those jurisdictions listed in the Com-
mission Decision, Dec. 5, 1965, cited in B.N.A. LAB. REL. ExPEDITm 1892e.
42. Gould-Nat'l Batteries, Inc., 61-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AwArns ff 8500 (Jan., 1961)
(female not allowed to bump into foundry job).
43. Apex Mach. & Tool Co., 65-2 CCH LAB. Arm. AWAnDS U 8787 (Sept. 30, 1965)
(women employees lacked skill to qualify as turret lathe operators).
44. Centrex Corp., 65-2 CCH LAB. ABB. AwArDs U 8737 (Oct., 1965).
45. Collins Radio Co., 66-1 CCH LAB. ArB. AwAnDs U[ 8037 (Dec. 7, 1965) (male
job more hazardous and required greater skill). In his decision, the arbitrator dis-
cusses the bona fide occupational qualification exception of Title VII. See also Cam-
bridge Tile Mfg. Co., 66-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AWAnns ff 8098 (Dec. 2, 1965).
46. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 64-2 CCH LAB. ABB. AwARDS U 8676 (April 20, 1964)
(female doing man's job held entitled to man's rate of pay). See also Imperial
Camera Corp., 66-2 CCH LAB. AnB. AwAmns ff 8424 (March 30, 1966).
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of this approach by the arbitrators to that of the courts under the
Equal Pay Act is noteworthy.47 Arbitrators have also been concerned
with state regulation of the employment of women. They have up-
held the denial of promotion1 or bumping rights49 to women as not
discriminatory when such denials were required by state law.
It is not possible here to complete a thorough examination of the
treatment by arbitrators of sex discrimination, but the few examples
given demonstrate that the arbitrators have already met and fashioned
solutions for many of the programs which arise under Title VII, and
which will be examined in Part IV. It would seem that the large
number of these arbitration decisions might well provide guidelines
for the EEOC to consider in the solution of its problems.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF T=E TITLE VII PRoHBrrON OF
SEX DisCMEhATION
"The sex amendment can best be described as an orphan, since
neither the proponents nor the opponents of Title VII seem to have felt
any responsibility for its presence in the Bill."50 The startling truth is
that the presence of the word "sex" is the result of what could be
termed an historical accident. H. R. 7152, later to become known as
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was introduced in the House by Rep-
resentative Emanuel Celler on June 20, 1963, without any mention
of the word "sex." While the bill was before the House Judiciary
Committee, the sex amendment was introduced by Committee Chair-
man Howard Smith.5 1 Representative Smith was an opponent of the
bill, and indications are that he proposed the amendment in the hope
that its addition would lead to defeat of the entire bill.52 There was
no testimony on the amendment before the Judiciary Committee, nor
did any organization petition Congress to add the word "sex" to the
bill.53 It is doubtful that the amendment was favored by a majority
47. See Wirtz v. Basic, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 786 (D. Nev. 1966) (female lab analyst
entitled to same wages paid to males when work was substantially equal and required
substantially same skill and responsibility).
48. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 66-29 CCH LAB. Arm. Aw.Ais ff 8708 (undated) (pro-
motion barred by state lifting restriction for females). See also Advanced Structures,
63-1 CCH LAB. Ann. AwAnms 1[ 8172 (Jan. 11, 1963).
49. Standard Oil Co. (Ohio), 65-2 CCH LAB. Ann. AwAxsDs I[ 8591 (Aug. 11, 1965)
(woman denied right to bump into job which required repeated lifting in excess of
statutory limit).
50. Berg, Equal Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROosavr. L.
REv. 62, 79 (1964).
51. Hearings on H.R. 7152, Before the Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Feb. 8, 1964).
52. See 110 CoNe. REc. 2583 (1964) (remarks of Representatives Celler & Green).
53. Indicating lack of support for the amendment in the House debate, Represen-
tative Celler introduced a letter from the Department of Labor stating that a bill
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of those who supported the enactment of Title VII, 4 but in the Senate
no one even proposed that the amendment be stricken. The position
of those Congressmen who never voiced an opinion and then sup-
ported the sex amendment has never been explained. 55 Moreover, the
accidental nature of the inclusion of sex as a prohibited basis of
discrimination in Title VII and the concomitant lack of any helpful
legislative history has presented serious problems to the EEOC.50
IV. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE Trr= VII PRom mrnoN OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION
A. Unlawful Conduct
By its terms, Title VII proscribes certain broad categories of con-
duct. An employer violates the law if, because of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin, he: (a) fails or refuses to hire an applicant for
employment; (b) discharges an employee; (c) discriminates against
an applicant for employment or an employee in compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment; or (d) limits, segregates or
classifies employees in any way which would deprive or tend to de-
prive employees of employment opportunities or adversely affect their
status as employees.57 Title VII also makes it an unlawful practice for
an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or
otherwise discriminate for or against an individual on the basis of
race, religion, color, sex or national origin.8 A labor organization is
giving separate treatment to sex discrimination would be preferable to its inclusion
in H.R. 7152, and indicating that even leading women's organizations were not satis-
fied with its inclusion. See B.N.A., OPERAIONS MANUAL ON THE CIVML cirs Acr
OF 1964, 336 (1964).
54. Berg, supra note 50, at 78-79.
55. Waters, supra note 40, at 347.
56. In a speech before the National Council of Women's Conference of Women at
Work, Oct. 12, 1965, EEOC Chairman Roosevelt made the following remarks concern-
ing the sex provision: "This provision was tacked on rather suddenly without the
usual committee hearings, to a law concerned primarily with racial discrimination.
We undertake its enforcement without the benefit of the guidelines, the legislative
history and the court decisions that we can rely on in pursuing some of our other
responsibilities under Title VII. So we must develop these guidelines as we go along."
57. 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(a) (1964). The act indicates in two places that in order
to find an employer guilty of these unfair labor practices, it is necessary to find that
he acted with discriminatory intent. Section 200e-5(g) states that in a civil action by
an individual, the court may enjoin the unlawful employment practice "Ei]f the court
finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an
unlawful employment practice .... ." (Emphasis added.) Likewise, § 2000e-6(a)
grants the Attorney General power to bring a civil suit for an injunction or other
appropriate relief if he has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of
persons is engaging in a pattern of resistance to the rights secured by the act "and
that the pattern or practice is . . . intended to deny the full exercise of [these] rights
. " (Emphasis added).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1964).
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guilty of an unlawful employment practice if, because of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin it: (a) excludes or expels from mem-
bership or otherwise discriminates against an individual; (b) limits,
segregates or classifies its membership in a manner which would de-
prive or tend to deprive or limit an individual with respect to em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect an individual's
status as an employee or applicant for employment; (c) curtails an
individual's employment status or his opportunity for employment;
(d) fails or refuses to refer an individual for employment; or (e)
causes or attempts to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual. 9
B. EEOC Rulings and Guidelines
Title VII established the EEOC to interpret and apply its pro-
visions. Athough the Commission itself has no enforcement powers,60
it serves a vital function in interpreting the application of broad areas
of proscribed conduct to specific cases. The EEOC rulings and guide-
lines indicate that there are two basic types of sex discrimination:
that affecting the right to obtain and hold a job; and that affecting the
right to equal treatment of the sexes while on the job. The Com-
mission's treatment of the more significant problems under each of
these follows.
1. The right to obtain and hold a job.-A rule by an employer for-
bidding or restricting the employment of married women but not of
married men is unlawful.61 However, special circumstances may exist
where an unmarried status is a bona fide occupational qualification
for a job, such as appears to be the case in the requirement that air-
line stewardesses be single.62 Refusal to recall a female following
pregnancy leave violates Title VII, and an employer may not termi-
nate the employment of a pregnant woman without first offering her
a leave of absence. An exception arises if her job is such that it cannot
be either filled temporarily or left vacant, in which instance she may
be replaced. The employer does have the right to decide at what time
during her pregnancy a woman's employment should be suspended.63
The EEOC analysis extends to pre-employment discrimination as
well. Help-wanted advertising may not indicate a preference based
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964). To find a union gulity of an unlawful employ-
ment practice, it is necessary to establish discriminatory intent, just as in the case of
an employer. See note 57 supra.
60. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
61. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3 (1967).
62. EEOC General Counsel Opinion, Sept. 22, 1965, reprinted in, CCH EMPLOY-
2mENr PrsencEs U 17,251.043.




on sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for the job
involved.64 Furthermore, in pre-employment questionnaires an em-
ployer may ask the applicant's sex only if the inquiry is made in good
faith for a nondiscriminatory purpose.65
2. The right to equal treatment of the sexes while on the job.-
The Commission interprets Title VII to make it an unlawful employ-
ment practice to classify a job as "male" or "female" or to maintain
separate lines of progression or separate seniority lists based on sex,
unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification. This same restric-
tion applies to transfer, promotion, layoff, discharge and other terms
and conditions of employment.66 Furthermore, the payment of smaller
sickness or life insurance benefits to female employees than to males
is unlawful. Finally, the refusal to allow females to work overtime
where not prohibited by state law violates Title VII,68 as does a
discriminatory reduction of the work week69 or a provision in the
collective bargaining agreement for a longer guaranteed work week
for men than for women, unless the men and women occupy different
job classifications based on bona fide occupational qualifications. 0
C. Discrimination Not Within Title VII
Title VII permits discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color,
sex or national origin in a number of instances, most of which are of
minor significance.7 1 In addition, the EEOC has listed several other
64. EEOC Decision, Nov. 22, 1965.
65. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.6 (1967).
66. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1967).
67. EEOC Insurance Benefits Guidelines, June 29, 1966; EEOC Opinion Letters,
Oct. 1, 1965, Oct. 12, 1965, Jan. 6, 1966, Jan. 28, 1966, Aug. 25, 1966, reprinted in
CCH EMPnLoYmNT PRAaTcEs f 17,251.
68. EEOC Opinion Letter, Dec. 20, 1965, reprinted in, CCH EMIPLOYMNT PRACTICES
17,251.
69. EEOC Opinion Letter, Dec. 10, 1965, reprinted in, CCH EMPLOYMENT PRAC-
TICES ff 17,251.
70. EEOC Opinion Letters, March 11, 1966, July 29, 1966, reprinted in, CCH
EMPLOY~mNT PRAcUCEs ff 17,251.
71. The prohibitions of the act do not apply where: (1) religion, sex or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the business enterprise (this most important exception is dealt with in
Part IV); (2) an educational institution owned or supported by a religion employs
members of that religion; (3) the persons discriminated against are members of the
Communist party or a Communist-front organization; (4) the employer is subject to
a government security program and the persons involved do not have security clearance;
(5) a business operating on or near an Indian reservation accords preferential treat-
ment to Indians; (6) the different standards of compensation or terms and conditions
of employment are applied pursuant to a bona fide seniority program, merit system,
or system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or they result
from the fact that the employees work in different locations; (7) the employer acts
upon the results of a professionally developed ability test that is not designed or
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situations of discrimination which are not within the purview of the
act. Thus, Title VII does not apply to membership applications of
private men's clubs and country clubs,72 nor does it extend to the
exclusion of women from jury duty service.73 The number of possible
bases of employment discrimination is almost infinite, and the EEOC
has indicated several times that discrimination on any non-statutory
ground is not outlawed.74
V. PRoBLEM AREAS
A. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) Exception
Until discrimination because of sex was added to the law, the BFOQ
exception was of such limited importance that even the supporters of
the bill had difficulty citing an example of its applicability. With the
addition of sex to the act, the exception assumed great importance
as the only meaningful defense to a sex discrimination complaint, and
it was thought by some to be a "saving exception."75 From the word-
ing of the statute it is clear that a broad or loose interpretation of
this exception would render almost completely ineffective the prohi-
bition of discrimination on the basis of religion, sex or national origin.
Obviously aware of this, the EEOC has construed section 703(e)
very restrictively except in extreme cases, such as employment in-
volving strenuous activity, hazardous working conditions, intimate
contact with fellow workers or customers, and situations in which
a state law protects women from exploitation.7 6 For example, gen-
eralizations about the different sexes will not support a BFOQ; rather,
the employer must consider separately each situation. Thus, the as-
intended to be used to discriminate; or (8) differentiations in pay based on sex are
authorized under the provisions of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(e)-
(i) (1964).
72. EEOC Opinion Letter, Oct. 1, 1965, reprinted in, CCH EMPLOYMENT PIACnC-S
Ir 17,251.
73. EEOC General Council Opinion, Dec. 10, 1965, reprinted in CCH EMPLOYMmr
PRAT CCFS ir 17,251. See note 13 supra and accompanying text for judicial treatment
of this question.
74. The Commission has held that none of the following violate Title VII:
(a) refusal to hire or promote persons who lack necessary educational qualifications,
EEOC Opinion Letter, Oct. 2, 1965; (b) discrimination based on an employee's refusal
to work overtime, EEOC Opinion Letter, Dec. 21, 1965; (c) discrimination based on
age, EEOC Opinion Letter, Oct. 1, 1965; (d) discrimination based on political beliefs
or union activity, EEOC Opinion Letter, Nov. 22, 1965. Some of these bases of
discrimination are clearly violative of other laws, but they do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the EEOC.
75. See Berg, supra note 50, at 72. See also Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex
and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50 IowA L. REv. 778, 792 (1965).
76. EEOC Policy Statement, CCH EMPLOYT. PRAc. Guiox ff 16,903 (Aug. 19, 1966).
For a discussion of the relation between Title VII and state laws regulating the employ-
ment of women, see Part IV(B) infra.
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sumption that there is a higher turnover rate among females, that
men are less capable at assembling intricate equipment, or that fe-
males are less aggressive in salesmanship will not furnish the basis
for a BFOQ.77 Also, co-worker, employer, or client preference for
employees of a certain sex will not make sex a BFOQ, except where
necessary for authenticity or genuineness, such as in the employment
of an actor or actress.78
In addition to these and other rulings and policy decisions of the
EEOC, a fund of interpretations of the bona fide occupational quali-
fication is found in labor arbitration decisions since the enactment of
Title VII. As shown in Part I(C) above, these decisions indicate the
arbitrators' practice of frequently deciding disputes on whether the
sex discrimination in a certain instance is founded on a bona fide
distinction. The EEOC rulings, coupled with the decisions of the
arbitrators, show that thus far the BFOQ exception has not been the
"saving exception" for which some writers had hoped. 9 To the con-
trary, it appears that the Commission may have gone too far in its
expressed desire to restrict the exemption.80 It thus remains for the
judiciary to set a final standard for the scope of the exemption, and
to pass on the problem of what types of evidence will be relevant in
establishing a bona fide occupational qualification.
B. Relation of Title VII to State Fair Employment Practice Laws
In section 705(g)81 Congress specifically rejects the application of
the supremacy clause, therefore ending any contention that federal
law affords the exclusive remedy for discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. Specific language indicates that
nothing in the act is to be construed as preempting or invalidating
any aspect of state law, except where that law is inconsistent with
the purposes of, or unlawful under, the federal law.82 To the contrary,
Title VII requires that a complainant first seek redress under his state
FEP law before proceeding under Title VII. It further provides
77. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)
(1967). For example, an employer may not refuse a job requiring heavy lifting to
a particular woman, on the assumption that women generally cannot lift heavy weights,
without first testing her strength. EEOC Opinion Letter, Oct. 27, 1965, reprinted in,
CCH EmPLoYmENT PRACnCES ff 17,251.
78. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1967).
79. See note 75 supra.
80. The Commission's reasoning for this strict interpretation of the exception is
vaguely stated in its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)
(1967): "The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification ex-
ception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly. Labels--'Men's jobs' and 'Women's
jobs-tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one sex or the other."
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (1964).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1964).
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that the EEOC is to cooperate with state agencies, utilize their ser-
vices, and cede its authority to them where adequate remedies are
available under state law.83 On the surface, this desire of Congress
seems fair and workable; in reality, however, it provides a maze of
difficulty in attempting to reach a workable synthesis of Title VII,
state FEP laws and, in the case of sex, state laws delimiting the
terms and conditions of the employment of women. Such a synthesis
is essential for the federal and state laws to work together in the way
desired by Congress, yet it has thus far proved unreachable. This
principal problem posed by Title VII results from its failure to fit
smoothly into the framework of existing state laws. One major source
of difficulty is that the sex amendment was tacked onto a bill which
passed with so little discussion of the amendment that there is no
expression of Congressional intent as to the relation to state law regu-
lating the employment of women.84
1. The Position of the EEOC.-Pursuant to section 706(b), the
EEOC will defer to those states which outlaw discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion and national origin and which provide for
a state authority to grant relief in matters dealing with those grounds
of discrimination (32 states). It will defer in cases of sex discrimi-
nation to those states in which FEP laws outlaw such discrimination
and which provide for administrative reliefAs  The Commission will
not defer to those states which, although banning various types of
discrimination, do not provide a state administrative agency for en-
forcement, or which provide for only voluntary compliance.
6
As to the interaction of Title VII with state laws regulating the
employment of women, the EEOC's position is not so definite as
in the relation to state FEP laws. That the Commission is in a
quandary pending judicial decision is obvious. The Commission Guide-
lines state that the EEOC will not make a determination on the
merits of a case which presents a conflict between Title VII and
state protective legislation where administrative exceptions are un-
available.17 In such a case, the EEOC will advise the charging parties
of their right to bring suit, within thirty days after review by the
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1964).
84. Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII,
34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 249 (1965). See also EEOC Chairman Roosevelt's speech
before the National Council of Women's Conference of Women at Work, supra note 56.
85. See states listed in note 41 supra.
86. Idaho, Maine, Montana and Vermont provide criminal sanctions for employment
discrimination an account of race, religion, color and national origin but do not es-
tablish a state enforcement agency. Arizona, Oklahoma, Tennessee and West Virginia
provide only for voluntary compliance with anti-discrimination laws. Commission.
Decision, Dec. 5, 1965.
87. Commission Guidelines, issued Aug. 19, 1966.
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EEOC under section 706(e), to secure a determination by the court
of the validity of the state law or regulation. In such a case, the
EEOC reserves the right to appear as amicus curiae and argue for
what it considers the correct interpretation of Title VII. The EEOC
general counsel has reiterated most of what appears in the Commis-
sion Guidelines and emphasizes that in the absence of a court ruling
the EEOC will refuse to decide which law an employer may or
must ignore when the state protective law and Title VII are in con-
fdict.8
2. The Need for Judicial Action.-The discussion above points to
the need for a court decision in this area. In the interim, one can
only speculate as to how Title VII and the state protective laws will
be reconciled. The issue can be reduced to whether the state pro-
tective law creates an absolute BFOQ, or one which is conditional
upon its not conflicting with the policy of Title VII, or no BFOQ at
all. State laws prohibiting the employment of women in hazardous
positions such as mining present no problem, for such a distinction
would probably be well within the BFOQ exception.9 The problem
arises when the Commission feels that the state's basis of protection
is not a valid distinction, such as in a state law forbidding women to
be bartenders.-0 As mentioned above, the Commission has frequently
expressed disfavor with employers who decide a woman is unfit for
a certain job because the employer's opinion is based upon the quali-
fications of a stereotyped woman; yet it is precisely on such stereo-
types that state protective laws are based. The conflict resulting
here cannot be reconciled within the framework of Title VII, and
therefore must be resolved by the courts.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
As has been shown, the presence of the word "sex" in Title VII is
largely an historical accident, and it was added with little thought
given to consequences. But it is there nonetheless, raising problems
which are largely the result of its thoughtless inclusion. Any evalu-
ation of the provision against sex discrimination raises three questions:
(a) whether an elimination of sex discrimination in employement is
88. EEOC General Counsel Opinion, Sept. 15, 1966, reprinted in, CCH EMPLOYMENT
PRACTiCES 11 17,251.
89. Berg, supra note 50, at 79.
90. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1967).
The Commission states that it believes that some state protective laws, while necessary
at the time they were enacted, have now become outmoded and unnecessary, while
others still serve the purpose of protecting women from exploitation and should be
retained. The example given in the Guidelines is that of a state restriction on the
weight women employees may lift on the job, which would not be in conflict with
Title VII unless the limit were set too low.
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desirable; (b) if it is desirable, whether a federal statute of the nature
of Title VII is the appropriate way to end sex discrimination; and
(c) whether Title VII is workable and effective in achieving this goal?
Throughout legal history until very recently, discrimination against
women has been so common that it has been almost an assumed fact.
By comparison to the length of time that women had almost no legal
rights, their emancipation under the common law and their winning
of suffrage under the nineteenth amendment are comparatively recent.
And despite Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, sex-based
inequality remains in a great many laws.91 It is far more pervasive
in our laws and customs than any form of racial discrimination, and
exists in the laws of almost every foreign nation. Clearly the most
obvious reason women have not been able to obtain legal rights is
that, with the exception of a few militant groups who have con-
stantly demanded rights, most women have not cared about their
sex-based inequality.92 The various movements started by such groups
as The League of Women Voters and The National Women's Party
have failed to stir all but those of the female "intellectual elite or
those who have inherited or retained the feminist tradition."93 It is
noteworthy that no women's group even petitioned for or supported
the sex amendment to Title VII. The most popular explanation of
the apathy of American women over sex-based inequality is that ad-
vanced by Simon de Beauvoir in The Second Sex, in which the author
states that throughout history women have become conditioned to
thinking of themselves as "The Other" and, consequently, have lost
their desire to compete with, or be equal to men. 4
Another reason which may explain female apathy and which serves
as an argument in favor of sex-based inequality is the nature of the
laws which deny women equality. It is true that these laws are
discriminatory, but they favor women in that their purpose is the
protection of the "weaker" sex. It is accurate to say that the ma-
jority of these laws distinguish rather than discriminate. Traditionally,
man has tended to protect woman, and it is doubtful that either
Title VII or militant female organizations will change this.
But now that employment equality has been promised to women
by Title VII, the strong argument in favor of such equality must
come to the fore, and the basis of that argument is economic. Just
as in the case of employment discrimination against the Negro, the
past discrimination against women has left a vast productive resource
largely unused. In the past, the jobs and pay rates available to women
91. See generally Kanowitz, supra note 15.
92. See Murray & Eashvood, supra note 84.
93. Kanowitz, supra note 15, at 296.
94. S. DF Biwvoin, THE SEcoND SEx (1961).
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have been quite inferior to those of men.95 Yet figures from the Presi-
dent's Commission on the Status of Women reveal that as of April,
1962, 24,000,000 women were in the work force, and the forecast is
for 30,000,000 by 1970.6 It is estimated that eight or nine out of
every ten women will be gainfully employed at some time during their
lives. Furthermore, and most importantly, women are the responsible
heads of 4,643,000, or one-tenth, of all families in the United States,
and more than 23 per cent of non-white families are headed by
women. Nearly half the families headed by women have incomes
of less than $3,000 and nearly three-fourths of non-white families
headed by women live in poverty. These statistics from the Presi-
dent's Commission present an almost irrebutable argument in favor
of employment equality between the sexes. It remains, however,
to evaluate the mechanism by which we seek to achieve this desired
equality.
The questions of whether a federal statute such as Title VII is an
appropriate way to regulate sex discrimination and whether the mech-
anism under Title VII is workable and effective are so interrelated
that they may be considered together. As has been stated, inclusion
of the sex amendment did not reflect the careful thought and debate
which accompanied the Act's other provisions. Because of this, the
EEOC started in a void with little or nothing in the way of guide-
lines from Congress concerning the sex discrimination provisions.
Already, in its attempts to fill this void, the Commission has reached
a dead end where state laws protecting women run afoul of the
policy of the Act and must await resolution by the courts.
This lack of legislative planning has given rise to another problem
which is, at present, insoluble-the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion exception. It has been argued with obvious logic that a loose
interpretation would subvert the aim of equal employment oppor-
tunity.9 Yet equally logical is the opposing view that a restrictive
interpretation would fail to give adequate consideration to sound
arguments for occasionally treating men and women differently in
employment where office morale, client preferences, or other factors
require. The EEOC has expressly followed the restrictive approach,
but this view will almost certainly be challenged in the courts, so
that the final scope of the bona fide occupational qualification excep-
tion may be a long time in being settled.
Finally, there is the uncertainty of how Title VII, state FEP laws,
95. See generally Sanborn, Pay Differences Between Men and Women, 17 IND, &
L.A .REL.. REv. 534 (1964).
96. PRESMEN'S CONse'N ON THE STATUS OF WoMEN, REPORT OF THE COAnjTnTE
ON PRavATE EMPLOymENT (1963).
97. Murray & Eastwood, supra note 84, at 244.
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and state laws protecting women in employment should relate. The
expressed desire of Congress that Title VII and state laws should
enjoy a dynamic interaction is idealistic, but, to date, only ten states
have followed the lead of the federal law and have made illegal any
employment discrimination based on sex. The other wide difference
between the state and federal law surrounds the state protective laws
and leads to unpredictability as to when the EEOC will defer to the
state protective policy and when it will say that the federal law
supercedes.
The net effect of the above problems is unpredictability and un-
certainty. The situation presented to the employer, union or employ-
ment referral agency is colossally puzzling. The inevitable conclusion
must be that while Title VII is theoretically sound and well inten-
tioned, it has proved to be nearly unworkable in many practical
situations. The saving feature of it may well be that it does pro-
vide a mechanism whereby decisions can be made, and these decisions
are reviewable. Perhaps several years of EEOC decisions and judicial
review will eventually hew out of Title VII a workable and predict-
able mechanism to regulate sex discrimination in employment.
A_,mo, R. MANsFIELD
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